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III. About the Country Insights Lab Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues. 
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Jakarta on 6–7 May and 2–3 June 
2014 and 20–21 April 2015. It conducted interviews in Denpasar-Ubud on 3–5 
June 2015. 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
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IV. Indonesia  
A. Historical Background 
A maritime analogue to the silk road running 
through Central Asia, the Indonesian archipelago 
was a key ancient trade route linking Chinese 
goods to markets in India and farther west into 
the Mediterranean. Its cosmopolitan ports attract-
ed significant numbers of Arab, Indian and Chi-
nese merchants and holy men and fostered the 
exchange of goods as well as cultural and reli-
gious ideas. Cultural appropriation had a clear 
Indian bias. Starting in the early eighth century, 
the various islands saw the rise and fall of several 
Indianised Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms, includ-
ing Mataram, Singhasari and Majapahit in east 
Java and Srivijaya in Sumatra. Islam, which now 
forms the majority religion of modern Indonesia, 
also came with Indian merchants from Gujarat 
and the Coromandel Coast. Several mainstays of 
Indonesian culture, such as its religious architec-
ture, traditional dances and use of Indian epics in 
the wayang, belie strong Indic influences.  
Spice-hungry Portuguese caravels had begun to 
penetrate the Indian Ocean in 1498, but rival Eu-
ropean colonisers were primarily confined to 
ports and spice-producing islands until the nine-
teenth century. Although the Dutch crown did not 
extend direct control over the entirety of the In-
dies until the 1920s, the Dutch East India Compa-
ny had monopolised maritime trade as early as 
the seventeenth century and was able to force 
local rulers to sell quotas of raw goods at low 
fixed prices. Dutch colonial policies toward the 
Indies were overwhelmingly extractive in nature 
and encouraged little infrastructure development 
outside what was necessary to move cash crops 
(coffee, sugar, indigo and spices) from local plan-
tations to sale at markets in Europe. The period 
after 1848 saw the introduction of some liberalis-
ing measures to improve the lives of native sub-
jects, but the overall reforms were piecemeal and 
secondary to the extractive industries. The gov-
ernment did not establish native schools until 
1893, and educated natives were barred from 
occupying even low-level positions in the civil 
service until 1905.  2
Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has 
swung between wild consensus-based politics 
under Sukarno, authoritarianism under Suharto 
and (more recently) a renewed drive towards lib-
eral democratic institutions. Sukarno’s disastrous 
policies throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, 
which ended in a failed invasion of newly-inde-
pendent Malaysia, runaway inflation, famine and 
economic collapse, encouraged his deposition in 
a military coup. The authoritarian Suharto regime 
(1965–1998) presided over a period of sustained 
and stable economic growth, in spite of repres-
sive policies directed towards political oppo-
nents, civil society groups and the press. Suharto’s 
“New Order” secured a rescheduling of foreign 
debts and attracted aid from the U.S., Europe and 
Japan via its anti-communist credentials. During 
Suharto's last decade and a half as president, 
Indonesia posted an average annual growth of 
7.1 percent.  Once the largest importer of rice 3
globally, it had become a net exporter by the 
mid-1980s. 
Behind this veneer of rapid development, Suhar-
to’s practice of awarding contracts and monopo-
lies to loyal family members, military insiders and 
Chinese taipans hollowed out any existent checks 
and balances on the executive. When the New 
Order collapsed in the aftermath of the 1997 
Asian Financial crisis, three decades of patrimoni-
al politics had left behind few well-functioning 
government institutions. Energies in the last two 
decades have largely been devoted to a tug-of-
war between liberal institutionalists advocating 
for regulatory bodies and machine politicians 
cum business cronies devoted to preserving their 
 D. R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia, 5th Ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003),1662
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank, accessed 15 June 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/.3
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own patronage systems. Decentralisation of gov-
ernment authority post-Suharto has generated 
additional opportunities for graft and pork barrel. 
In spite of the above concerns, Indonesia has 
made enormous strides towards establishing a 
stable democratic system in recent years. Al-
though more than 10,000 people perished in 
political violence between 1998 and 2003, the 
last decade has seen few major clashes.  Indone4 -
sians directly elected their president for the first 
time in 2004, and the election of political outsider 
Jokowi in 2014 has renewed optimism that voters 
can beat political patronage systems linked to 
Suharto or his predecessors. Jokowi has neverthe-
less found it necessary to make concessions to 
entrenched interests, such as Sukarno’s daughter, 
Megawati. His nomination of people close to 
Megawati to the Corruption Eradication Commis-
sion (KPK) and other key government posts has 
cost him a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of 
Indonesia’s increasingly social media-savvy elec-
torate. 
Indonesia has posted steady macroeconomic 
growth hovering around six percent for the last 
five years, and attracting foreign investment and 
expertise will be crucial to growing the country 
into a regional powerhouse. The rapid economic 
rise of India and China in particular has renewed 
the archipelago’s historic role as an entrepôt for 
inter-Asian trade. Xi Jinping recently promised to 
increase bilateral trade between China and In-
donesia by US$80 billion, while former Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pledged to 
boost India-ASEAN trade by US$100 billion.  5
However, rising nationalism has also spurred In-
donesian politicians to push through protectionist 
measures. In 2012, the government re-instituted 
state-owned logistics agency Bulog as the sole 
determiner of rice, sugar and soybean prices. In 
2014, the government opened advertising, 
broadcasting, telecommunications and pharma-
 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2014 Indonesia Country Report (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014), 2.4
 Ulla Fionna et al., “Indonesia in 2013: Anticipating 2014,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2014), 127.5
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Indonesia By Numbers
Surface Area: 
1,910,000 sq km
Population:
246.86 million [2012]
Population Density:
129.2 per sq km
Population of Jakarta:
9.77 million
Urban Population:
52.3% [2013]
Currency:
Indonesian Rupiah (IDR)
GDP (Nominal):
US$878.04 billion [2012]
Growth Rate:
6.2% [2012]
GDP Per Capita:
US$3,556.80 [2012]
Unemployment:
6.2% [2012]
Tourist Arrivals Annually:
8.04 million [2012]
Mobile-Cellular Subscriptions:
115.2 per 100 inhabitants [2012]
Individuals Using Internet:
15.4% [2012]
Life Expectancy at Birth:
Females (72.8 years); Males (68.7 years)
Forested Area:
51.8% [2011]
Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org)
ceuticals to foreign participation, but it placed 
additional restrictions on foreign investment in 
the energy, oil, gas and minerals industries.   
More importantly, the Jokowi administration must 
generate policies that ensure that all Indonesians 
share in new economic gains. 51 percent of the 
population still lives on less than US$2 a day, and 
the figure is even higher in outlying islands, where 
rural residents lack access to basic infrastructure 
and social services.  29 out of every 1,000 In6 -
donesian children die before reaching the age of 
five, and 190 out of every 100,000 births result in 
maternal death.  The government’s plans to pro7 -
vide health insurance to all Indonesians by 2019 
will help to improve these numbers, but poverty 
alleviation ultimately hinges on the ability of the 
private sector to deliver increased incomes. In-
donesia currently relies heavily on extractive min-
eral industries, which employ minimal personnel, 
and there are few opportunities for unskilled rural 
residents outside raw agricultural commodities. 
B. Current Challenges 
❖ Weak administration hampering the imple-
mentation of laws that were meant to promote 
CSR and  and accountability.  
During the Suharto-era, Indonesian business be-
came synonymous with large corporate interests 
linked to government sponsorship. Both state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), such as oil giant Pert-
amina, and conglomerates owned by Indonesian-
Chinese businessmen (cukong), including Lippo, 
Salim, Sampoerna and Ciputra, dominated ex-
port-oriented industries for three decades. In-
donesian-Chinese financiers provided generals 
and government officials with access to capital in 
exchange for state concessions and monopoly 
rights. However, following the 1997 Asian Finan-
cial Crisis, the cukongs have largely lost ground to 
a more varied group of SOEs and multinationals. 
While 20 Indonesian conglomerates, almost all 
Chinese-owned, accounted for 56 percent of 
nominal GDP in 1996, the largest 20 companies 
only accounted for 17.9 percent of nominal GDP 
in 2012.   8
In 2007, Indonesia passed Law No. 40, Article No. 
74, which made Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) mandatory for limited liability companies 
involved in extractive industries. However, there 
are several matters pertaining to the law that have 
yet to be clarified. Corporations and legal institu-
tions are provided with little guidance in terms of 
what CSR consists of, what percentage of funds 
should be spent on CSR or which institutions 
(corporations, the government or associated civil 
society groups) should administer and monitor 
the funds. Article 47 also stipulates that those 
companies that do not institute CSR practices will 
face sanctions, but Indonesia’s weak and decen-
tralised judicial system has experienced past 
problems in enforcing labour and environmental 
regulations.  9
Civil society and activist groups have grown 
rapidly in the post-reformation period and today 
form a powerful counterweight to big business 
interests. In 2012, there were more than 19,000 
registered perkumpulan (associations) and 
yayasan (foundations) in Indonesia, including 
large Islamic organisations such as Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah, labour unions, in-
digenous activists, environmental watchdogs, 
women’s rights associations, churches, agrarian 
organisations and political groups.  As much as 10
84 percent of Indonesians belong to some form 
of civil society organisation, the highest in South-
east Asia.  11
 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2014 Indonesia Country Report, 13.6
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank.7
 Yuri Sato, “Business Groups in Indonesia: What has Changed and What Remains Unchanged?” (presentation, Singapore Management 8
University, Singapore, 9 September 2014).
 Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein, “ The Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia: Problems and Implications,” Journal of Business 9
Ethics 98 (2011), 460–461.
 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2014 Indonesia Country Report, 21.10
 Ibid., 7.11
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However, some Suharto-era legislation (Law No. 
8/1985) is still present in the Indonesian legal 
code and could potentially be used by the gov-
ernment to arrest members of civil society 
groups. Foreign-funded CSOs in particular are 
sometimes viewed as soft power extensions of 
Western donors, and such organisations must 
receive government permission to use interna-
tionally-sourced money. 
Law No. 16/2001 includes requirements that 
yayasans registered with the government must 
make a public summary of donations of more 
than IDR500 million in an Indonesian newspaper 
and submit to audits by government accountants. 
However, registration does not currently confer 
any benefits, such as tax exemptions for the or-
ganisation or tax deductions for donors, and small 
CSOs are often unable to muster the funds re-
quired to pay for accountants and registration 
costs. A 2009 survey revealed that only 15 per-
cent of Indonesian CSOs were compliant with the 
law.12
❖ Persistent poverty in rural districts stemming 
from lack of basic infrastructure. In spite of post-
ing consistent 6 percent growth since 2006, In-
donesia is still home to widespread poverty and 
widening inequalities between urban areas and 
the countryside. Although Indonesia now contains 
more billionaires per capita than either China or 
India, 51 percent of its population continues to 
subsist on less than US$2 per day.  The benefits 13
of economic growth have largely been confined 
to urban areas, leaving rural districts and islands 
outside Java, particularly those in the country’s 
east, with relatively little increase in material well-
being. Only 8.8 percent of urbanites earned in-
comes below US$1.25 per day in 2013, compared 
with 15.1 percent of rural residents.   14
Lack of modern roads, ports, railways and power 
supplies in remote regions contributes to the 
high-cost of doing business and provides private-
sector companies with few incentives to enter 
rural markets. Better infrastructure is vital to im-
proving productivity and generating jobs for rural 
Indonesians. The Jokowi government has 
pledged to spend IDR 290 trillion (US$23.2 bil-
lion) on infrastructure in 2015, but without effec-
tive public-private partnerships (PPP), the gov-
ernment alone will be unable to sustain the hun-
dred of billions needed to modernise far-flung 
provinces.  Current investment laws in Indonesia 15
make such PPPs difficult to arrange, and Jokowi's 
infrastructure programme currently faces hostility 
from some CSOs, which have taken an anti-colo-
nial stance against foreign-led PPPs. Recently, the 
Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah filed legal 
suits against the administration in the Constitu-
tional Court.  In order to revolutionise rural In16 -
donesia, the Jokowi government will need to rec-
oncile civil society concerns with badly-needed 
private-sector funds from multinationals.  
Finally, the tens of millions of Indonesians resid-
ing in poor rural communities also lack adequate 
access to health services, including vaccinations 
and basic medicine. A number of international 
organisations, such World Vision Indonesia, Save 
the Children and the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP), have worked with local 
communities and the central government to cre-
ate immunisation, nutrition education and doctor 
training programmes in remote regions. The In-
donesian Health Ministry has also recently un-
veiled an ambitious new universal health care 
scheme that will provide affordable coverage to 
millions of Indonesians. However, providing ac-
cess to healthcare services in the outer islands will 
continue to be a challenge for local governments, 
and public-sector insurance bodies will be re-
quired to work with civil society and social enter-
 Rustam Ibrahim, “Civil Society in Indonesia,” An ASEAN Society For All: Exploring the Scope For Civil Society Engagement, ed. by Terence 12
Chong and Stefanie Elies, 52–64 (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia, 2011), 54.
 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2014 Indonesia Country Report, 3213
 Ibid.14
 Winarno Zain, “President Jokowi’s infrastructure projects: Quantity vs Quality,” Jakarta Post, 23 February 2015.15
 Jeffrey Hutton, “Muslim NGO lawsuits threaten Indonesia president's reformist agenda,” Christian Science Monitor, 1 April 2015.16
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prises if they hope to access the most remote 
regions.  
❖ Rapidly shrinking rainforests linked to lack of 
livelihood opportunities in remote areas and 
among indigenous communities. Indonesia’s 94 
million hectares of rainforests are home to over 
1,500 species of birds and plants and capable of 
absorbing large quantities of greenhouse gases, 
but rapid deforestation and unsustainable devel-
opment have contributed to soil erosion, loss of 
indigenous livelihoods and transboundary haze. 
Indonesia loses 1.87 hectares of rainforest per 
year, many illegally.  The government struggles 17
to properly regulate the environmental and sus-
tainability sectors, and the increasingly decen-
tralised nature of the system since Suharto’s fall 
has given local politicians opportunities to out-
manoeuvre environmentalists. 
Under the Suharto regime, the government con-
sistently sold public forests to corporations with-
out prior or informed consent of the indigenous 
groups who had traditionally used these forests 
for their livelihoods. Post-reformation courts have 
upheld indigenous rights and environmental con-
servation in theory, but implementation has been 
haphazard. In May 2011, former president Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono instituted a two-year mora-
torium on new forestry concessions. A 2011 Con-
stitutional Court ruling also upheld indigenous 
ownership of public forests, but the government 
has yet to transfer land concessions to local 
groups. 
Development by large conglomerates has at 
times precipitated violent confrontations with 
indigenous peoples in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and 
West Papua. Since the Suharto-era, the govern-
ment has facilitated migration from densely-pop-
ulated Java, Madura and Bali to remote islands, 
where the newcomers have often come into con-
flict with indigenous groups. Indigenous rights 
CSO Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) 
estimated that there were 143 cases of conflict, 
expulsion and arrests of indigenous protesters in 
2013.  Within West Papua, indigenous protest 18
has taken on a clearly ethnic and separatist tone, 
with “Melanesian” politicians and CSOs in Vanu-
atu and Fiji advocating for an independent 
Papuan state. In January of 2015, the deaths of 
two Indonesian police officers led to widespread 
crackdowns on Papuan independence activists 
and local civil society groups. 
The challenge for Indonesia’s government is to 
bring the country into the developed world while 
conserving its rich ecological heritage. Remote 
communities in Indonesia need roads, bridges, 
energy grids and other infrastructure to raise 
standards of living. In order to reduce trans-
boundary haze, poor rural communities must 
have access to economic alternatives to the 
“slash-and-burn” method in agriculture. Several 
environmental NGOs working in Indonesia, such 
as Conservation International and Yayasan Kehati, 
currently collaborate with the Indonesian Ministry 
of Forestry and local communities to implement 
replicable business models fostering green de-
velopment, but Indonesia needs a far more com-
prehensive strategy to preserve its dwindling rain-
forests and reefs. 
   
❖ Increasing frequency of religious extremism 
and sectarian violence. Indonesia’s national ide-
ology, pancasila, stipulates belief in one God, but 
does not specify any adherence to a particular 
religion. However, 87.2 percent of Indonesians 
identify as Muslims, making it the largest Islamic-
majority country worldwide.  Mainstream Muslim 19
groups, such as Nathdlatul Ulama and Muham-
madiyah, have embraced the country’s secular 
democratic process, but the last two decades 
have seen an surge in Islamist fringe groups. 
In recent memory, Indonesia has housed relatively 
uncoordinated movements to create Islamic 
states in Aceh, West Java and South Sulawesi. 
 Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005: 15 Key Findings (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization  17
of the United Nations, 200).
 “Violence against Indonesia’s indigenous peoples spikes as government drags feet on land rights and forestry legislation,” Aliansi 18
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, 27 January 2014, http://www.aman.or.id/en/2014/01/27/violence-against-indonesias-indigenous-peoples-
spikes-as-government-drags-feet-on-land-rights-and-forestry-legislation/.
 “Indonesia,” CIA World Factbook, accessed on 15 June 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.19
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However, the end of centralised authoritarianism 
under Suharto has enabled religious conserva-
tives and fringe groups to hijack local democratic 
processes. More troubling, the return of mu-
jahideen in the 1990s from conflicts in 
Afghanistan has spawned local terrorist cells. In 
2002 and 2005, Indonesian Al-Qaeda affiliate 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) organised bombings in Bali 
that killed over 222 people. JI also orchestrated 
attacks on the Jakarta Marriott Hotel in 2003,  the 
Australian Embassy in 2004 and the Ritz-Carlton 
Hotel in 2009. Other militia groups such as, Laskar 
Jihad and Hizbut Tharir Indonesia have destroyed 
churches as well as businesses, such as bars and 
night clubs, that they deeemed un-Islamic. 
In post-reformation Indonesia, local politicians 
have been loathe to alienate conservative Islamic 
voters and have often ignored court injunctions 
against abuse of Christian groups and minority 
Islamic sects. Between 2005 and 2010, more than 
four hundred churches in Indonesia were forcibly 
closed. 30 Ahmadiyah mosques have also been 
forcibly closed since 2008, and mobs ransacked 
the houses of Shia community members in Madu-
ra in 2012.  Some paramilitary organisations, 20
such as the Betawi Brotherhood Forum and the 
Islamic Defenders Front, have become semi-legit-
imate arms of the local government, operating as 
de facto police forces in spite of judicial rulings 
against them.   
With support from the government, civil society 
can play a constructive role in reducing radicalisa-
tion and religious violence. Indonesia’s two 
largest Muslim organisations, Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdlatul Ulama, reached millions and have 
endorsed a moderate interpretation of Islam with-
in a plural democratic society. Other CSOs have 
established programmes dedicated to rehabilitat-
ing convicted terrorists. U.S.-based Search for 
Common Ground runs de-radicalisation initiatives 
for inmates serving time on terrorism charges and 
works with youth in religious schools to promote 
tolerance and understanding of religious differ-
ences. Social enterprises, such as Yayasan Prasasti 
Perdamaian, may also have a role in helping for-
mer terrorists find meaningful work and prevent-
ing them from falling back on old networks in 
times of financial need.  
C. Insights from the Indonesia Labs 
❖ Indonesia’s recent CSR law is an important step 
forward, but the absence of tangible benefits or 
enforcement mechanisms has provided few in-
centives for large corporations to give back to 
local communities. 
Article 74 of Law No. 40/2007 stipulates that 
companies involved in resource extraction must 
put aside funds for use in CSR programmes that 
benefit local communities, but the legislation 
lacks clear definitions and provides no positive 
incentives for corporations: 
(1) Companies doing business in the field of and/or in relation 
to natural resources must put into practice Environmental and 
Social Responsibility. (2) The Environmental and Social Respon-
sibility contemplated in paragraph (1) constitutes an obligation 
of the Company which shall be budgeted for and calculated as 
a cost of the Company performance of which shall be with due 
attention to decency and fairness. (3) Companies who do not 
put their obligation into practice as contemplated in paragraph 
(1) shall be liable to sanctions in accordance with the provisions 
of legislative regulations.  21
Article 74 makes no attempts to define what con-
stitutes CSR, how much money should be used 
for CSR or what manner of punishments await 
companies that fail to perform adequate CSR. For 
instance, it is unclear whether CSR is something 
implicit, involving “do no harm” principles in a 
company’s supply chains, or explicit, consisting of 
charity programmes that promote employee vol-
unteering, bursaries or skills training initiatives. 
Although Indonesia is the first country to pass a 
mandatory CSR law, European and North Ameri-
can courts have been far more effective at prose-
cuting labour and environmental violations. For-
eign multinationals have well-developed CSR 
programmes that comply with home country 
governance standards and well-oiled publicity 
 Ulla Fionna et al., “Indonesia in 2013: Anticipating 2014,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2014), 124–125.20
 Republic of Indonesia, Office of the President, The Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability 21
Company [legalised by the President of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta 16 August 2007].
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machines that highlight explicit CSR initiatives. It 
is however unclear if local Indonesian courts are 
capable of punishing negligent corporations. In 
the past, the relative power of SOEs and large 
conglomerates has prevented courts from enforc-
ing decisions regarding regulatory violations. In-
donesian corporations also do not enjoy any posi-
tive financial benefits, such as tax exemptions, for 
performing CSR under the new law. The lack of 
any foreseeable benefits or punishments means 
that local firms currently have few reasons to em-
bark on ambitious projects. 
The Indonesian corporations interviewed for this 
study had dedicated CSR initiatives to education-
al programmes, bursaries, infrastructure devel-
opment, health services and natural disaster as-
sistance, but none had ventured into environmen-
tal or human rights issues. Donations, while signif-
icant, were relatively small compared to the overall 
size of operations and fell far short of generating 
systemic change. One company interviewed had 
invested IDR 4,663 billion (US$350,000) in human 
capacity and IDR 1,935 (US$145,500) in in-
frastructure development in villages in Kaliman-
tan. While this is a significant gesture, such 
amounts are not enough to fill the tens of billions 
of dollars needed for infrastructure overhauls of 
Kalimantan and other outlying islands.  22
Religion and prestige may serve as motivators in 
the absence of effective legislation. For Muslims 
businesses, CSR can be portrayed as a form of 
zakat or alms-giving. Many Christian Chinese 
taipans, including Mochtar and James Riady (Lip-
po Group), Putera Sampoerna, Cherie Nursalim 
(GITI Group) and Ciputra, have established prom-
inent foundations in the last two decades.  In 23
addition to its religious roots, philanthropy has 
become a means of entering elite global circles 
and validating Indonesian businesspeople in the 
eyes of Western counterparts. 
If it is going to make a tangible difference in the 
lives of local people, CSR should aim for systemic 
change and encourage replication of successful 
initiatives. Multinational and local corporations 
currently fund small foundations and social entre-
preneurs to execute their CSR initiatives, but es-
tablishing connections between practitioners is 
currently haphazard and could benefit from cen-
tralised matchmaking. Such a matchmaking plat-
form could potentially bring CSR professionals 
together to create more comprehensive pro-
grammes for lifting rural populations out of 
poverty. 
❖ Local CSOs face significant hurdles in muster-
ing the resources necessary to fulfil governance 
and reporting requirements or to apply for in-
ternational grants. 
As the civil society sector becomes more profes-
sionalised, proper accounting methods will be-
come more and more vital if CSOs wish to have 
access to new funding sources. International 
grants often contain complex reporting require-
ments, and application is increasingly by invita-
tion only. The British Council is also in the process 
of lobbying a “social enterprise bill,” which will 
place greater importance on due diligence, 
transparency and financial reports for social busi-
nesses. 
Like corporations, Indonesian CSOs receive no 
tangible financial benefits, such as tax exemp-
tions, when they register with the government. At 
the same time, they must expend significant re-
sources on professional accounting procedures 
and government fees in order to meet registra-
tion requirements. Even large yayasans inter-
viewed were unable to comply with government 
audits without in-kind donations from multina-
tional accounting firms. Small organisations are 
simply unable to field the resources necessary to 
uphold rigorous accounting practices or conduct 
audits. Only 15 percent of Indonesian yayasans 
are registered under the current laws.  24
Unfortunately, donors are often unwilling to pro-
vide funds for “back end” administration costs, 
including salaries for grant writers and accoun-
 Interview with PT Bayan Resources in Jakarta on 21 April 2015.22
 Hoon Chang Yau, “Face, Faith and Forgiveness: Elite Chinese Philanthropy in Indonesia,” Journal of Asian Business 24.1–2 (2010), 56–59.23
 Rustam Ibrahim, “Civil Society in Indonesia,” 54..24
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tants. Private-sector companies may also view 
CSR as cheap public relations and earmark their 
donations for “front end” programmes. For this 
reason, administration staff at small CSOs often 
do double or triple duty as accountants, grant 
writers and public relations representatives. A 
substantial number are volunteers. Besides obvi-
ous governance issues, such practices present 
significant obstructions to raising the efficiency 
and overall effectiveness of CSOs. 
❖ Foreign donors and impact investors are overly 
focused on Indonesian environmental challenges 
at the expense of interconnected social issues. 
For many foreign donors, protecting Indonesia’s 
rain forests and conserving its rich biodiversity are 
among the chief reasons for giving to in-
ternational aid organisations. Large international 
grant making foundations working in Indonesia 
also spend significantly more money on environ-
mental and sustainability issues than on compa-
rable social and developmental challenges. 
Throughout the foreign-funded civil society sec-
tor, there is limited awareness of the manner in 
which livelihoods are tied to deforestation and 
environmental destruction. Instead, the in-
ternational community has at times vilified poor 
farmers involved in deforestation, in spite of un-
skilled rural residents having few alternatives to 
slash-and-burn agriculture. 
Civil society can generate comprehensive solu-
tions to many environmental issues by providing 
vital skills training and developing supply chains 
that enable poor rural farmers to pursue sustain-
able livelihoods. On the other hand, Indonesian 
organisations dedicated to social or livelihood 
issues may also attract additional international 
funding if they were to incorporate sustainability 
initiatives into their existing programmes. For in-
stance, Conservation International’s sustainable 
landscape partnerships initiative has provided 
sustainability training and supply chain support to 
local farmers in Sumatra as a way of combatting 
widespread slash-and-burn agriculture and im-
proving coffee, rubber and cocoa yields. Social 
enterprises may also attract increased foreign 
investment as a result of its commitment to sus-
tainable and eco-friendly industrial practices.  
❖ In spite of the high risk nature of social enter-
prise, impact investors are more cautious than 
many of their commercial counterparts, leading 
to few successful investment rounds and an over-
reliance on  debt vehicles. 
Expatriates and Indonesian “repats” returning 
from educations abroad have recently established 
social enterprise hubs in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, 
Bandung and Denpasar. These cities have large 
numbers of young people, well regarded univer-
sities and high net worth individuals willing to 
provide seed funding. 
There is currently an estimated US$300 million in 
impact investment funds devoted to Indonesia, 
but impact investors throughout Southeast Asia 
have been notably wary of using their money to 
finance social enterprises without the assurance 
of low-risk returns. Several organisations inter-
viewed reported consultations with various im-
pact investment funds, only to be turned down 
because the fund deemed their business too high 
risk. Some of these organisations had even grad-
uated from incubator and accelerator pro-
grammes that were supposed to have primed 
them for investment. Where impact investors have 
decided to put money into organisations, they 
have primarily employed debt vehicles that min-
imise risk. 
It should also be noted that several social enter-
prises interviewed found the social impact as-
sessments used by impact investors to measure 
social return on investment (SROI) of limited use. 
To date, no firm has developed a rigorous and 
scientific system of conducting SROI measure-
ments. Social entrepreneurs interviewed re-
marked that SROI ratings simply do not attract 
socially-conscious investors as promised. 
Of the social enterprises interviewed, those that 
were most successful had not received funding 
from impact investors. Instead, they had been 
connected to “angel investors” willing to absorb 
the increased risk and who viewed their invest-
ment as a longterm partnership rather than a 
speculative venture. Such investors have commit-
ted to not exiting the business they have invested 
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in, thus ensuring its ability to scale over the next 
five to ten years. Indonesia needs more platforms 
committed to connecting angel investors with 
social entrepreneurs. 
❖ With the ASEAN Economic Community coming 
into effect at the end of the year, Indonesian 
workers are still vastly unprepared to compete 
with their fellow ASEAN members and diversify 
their economy. 
Indonesia’s current economy continues to over-
whelmingly rely on resource extraction. Coal, nat-
ural gas, crude palm oil and other commodities 
make up two-thirds of exports. Indonesia is the 
leading exporter globally of palm oil and tin, the 
second-largest exporter of rubber and the fourth-
largest coal producer. It also contains the world’s 
largest gold mine—the Grasberg mine in Papua.  25
Recent economic slowdowns in China have led to 
flagging commodity prices, reducing Indonesia’s 
GDP, but it should also be noted that Indonesia’s 
extractive industries are largely capital intensive 
and provide only limited employment opportuni-
ties for its vast population. The wealth currently 
generated by the resource conglomerates has 
largely failed to filter down to local communities 
living in rural areas or remote provinces. Instead, 
upwards to 65 percent of Indonesians work in 
informal businesses and are frequently underem-
ployed.  26
Diversifying Indonesia’s economy will be difficult 
without a substantial middle-class consisting of 
highly-educated professionals. Indonesian firms 
require internationally-savvy managers and CEOs 
with business management skills, as well as en-
trepreneurial scientists and engineers, to bring in 
cutting-edge expertise and know-how that will 
develop services and generate jobs outside tradi-
tional resource-based industries. 23.1 percent of 
Indonesians have completed a tertiary degree, 
but local universities currently often do not teach 
practical business skills to undergraduates.  In 27
order to bring university education in Indonesia 
up to international standards, some local educa-
tional institutions have forged partnerships with 
world-class universities, including Northwestern 
University’s Kellogg School of Management and 
the MIT Sloan School of Management. These 
partnerships aim to teach Indonesian executives 
management skills to address the country’s eco-
nomic, social, ecological, and political challenges. 
Indonesia’s economy also requires better-trained 
workers and entrepreneurs at the grassroots level. 
Education, especially entrepreneurial education, 
provides alternatives to traditional, and largely 
unprofitable, agricultural activities. Unfortunately, 
children growing up in remote regions are often 
unable to complete school for a number of rea-
sons, including poor teacher attendance, long 
distances between school and home and the lack 
of parent buy-in. 
Java’s growing youth segment represents an 
enormous human capital opportunity. More than 
50 percent of adult Indonesians are under 25 
years of age. Javanese youths in particular are 
better educated and have more skills than thep-
revious generation. Several interviewees have 
suggested that the human capital developed in 
Java could be put to practical use by improving 
the lives in outlying provinces—for instance, 
through developing or improving systems that 
deliver adequate health services, clean energy or 
educational training. Partnerships between Ja-
vanese educational institutions and social entre-
preneurs operating in remote rural communities 
can help to narrow the development gap be-
tween Java and the outer islands. Recent gradu-
ates possess up-to-date skills and fewer family 
obligations, but they need incentives to put off 
seeking a job in Jakarta to spend time serving the 
broader Indonesian community. 
❖ The Indonesian business and civil society sec-
tors are often unwilling or reluctant to form part-
nerships with the government. 
There is currently a distinct lack of trust between 
the Indonesian government and other sectors. 
 “Spicing up growth: Bad policy as much as bad infrastructure is holding Indonesia back,” The Economist, 9 May 2015.25
 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2014 Indonesia Country Report, 14.26
 Ibid.27
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Both corporations and CSOs tend to lie low lest 
they attract unneeded attention, bullying and at-
tempts at graft from government offices. Indone-
sian business and civil society leaders are gener-
ally unwilling to speak candidly at forums attend-
ed by government officials, and even when gov-
ernment help is sought, dealings can be difficult 
and frustrating. Working relationships with civil 
servants are painstakingly cultivated but often cut 
short when officials are rotated out. Licensing 
procedure are convoluted enough that organisa-
tions often hire consultants who specialise in fill-
ing out government paperwork. 
Additionally, there is a sentiment among many 
Indonesian minority communities, such as Chris-
tians and Chinese, that the government has not 
designed policies and programmes to fit their 
needs. As such, these communities have con-
structed their own networks, schools and institu-
tions outside the government framework, which 
they see as unhelpful and obstructive. Minority-
based organisations in particular have tended to 
focus on creating private-civil society partnerships 
to the exclusion of the government. 
With the above in mind, government co-opera-
tion is essential to generating widespread sys-
temic change in any context. In spite of the rela-
tive autonomy of individual provinces, the central 
government is one of few entities uniting Indone-
sia’s over six thousand islands. Both the private 
sector and civil society have tangible stakes in the 
development of strong liberal institutions, such as 
the Constitutional Court and the KPK. And it is 
only by participating in government dialogues 
that they will be able to encourage robust checks 
and balances on executive and corporate power. 
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V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
Ancora Capital. Jakarta, 2 June 2014. 
Annika Linden Centre. Denpasar, 4 June 2015. 
Begawan Foundation. Ubud, 4 June, 2015. 
Ciputra GEPI Incubator. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
East Bali Cashews. Denpasar, 3 June 2015. 
East Bali Poverty Project. Denpasar, 4 June 2015. 
Global Philanthropists' Circle. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
Harita Group. Jakarta, 9 April, 2014. 
i3 Institute for Life Sciences. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
IPMI Business School. Jakarta, 7 May 2014. 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore, 4 June 2014. 
Jaringan Ekowisata Desa. Denpasar, 5 June 2015. 
Kalbe Foundation. Jakarta, 3 June 2014. 
Kalbe Group. Jakarta, 6 May and 3 June 2014. 
Kinara Indonesia. Jakarta, 20 April 2015. 
Kopernik. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
KPMG Indonesia. Jakarta, 3 June 2014. 
LGT Venture Philanthropy. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
Ministry of Research and Technology, Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
MIT Sloan School of Management. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
Monk's Hill Ventures. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
MV Commerce. Jakarta, 2 June 2014. 
Piaget Academy. Jakarta, 7 May and 3 June 2014. 
PT Bayan Resources. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
ROLE Foundation. Denpasar, 5 June 2015. 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
Satoe Indonesia. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
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Search for Common Ground Indonesia. Jakarta, 2 June 2014. 
Sinar Harapan Daily. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
Suar Intermuda. Jakarta, 3 June 2014. 
Ubrain TV Japan Inc. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
United in Diversity. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
United in Diversity Creative Campus. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
United in Diversity IDEAS. Jakarta, 6 May, 2014. 
Universitas Ciputra Entrepreneurship Center. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
University of Indonesia. Jakarta, 6 May 2014. 
UnLtd Indonesia. Jakarta, 21 April 2015. 
World Vision Indonesia. Jakarta, 3 June 2014. 
Yayasan Kehati. Jakarta, 20 April 2015. 
YCAB Foundation. Jakarta, 6 May and 3 June 2014. 
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VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter Indonesia?  
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Total Organisations Interviewed: 41 
SIO: 24 
 Nonprofits: 8 
 Corporate Philanthropy: 3 
 Social Enterprises: 6 
 Impact Investors: 1 
 Incubators: 6 
Government: 2 
Commercial: 7 
Media & Academia: 8 
ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
Media & Academia
8
Commercial
7
Government
2
SIO
24
SIO SUB-SECTORS
Incubators
6
Impact Investors
1
Social Ent.
6
Corporate Phil.
3
Nonprofits
8
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
now? Five years from now? 
4) How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
from when it first began operations in Indonesia? 
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3–5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
your current collaborations?  
10) Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such rela-
tionships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to 
succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society—look like to you? 
16) What skills and resources do Indonesian leaders need to better serve their society?  
17) The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as “the practice of creating sustainable 
value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.” Are there 
any remarkable individuals in Indonesia whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your 
current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives? 
Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
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Funding (for civic-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
to lower dependence on outside funding in the future? 
Context  
22) How does working in Indonesia differ from working in other Southeast Asian countries? 
What does Indonesia have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities 
actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing In-
donesia?  
25) How is Indonesia different from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in the 
next five years?  
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